In this paper we use responses to the second Community Innovation Survey (CIS II) to investigate the relative importance of finance as a constraint to innovation in Europe and also explore differences across industries, countries and firm sizes in the importance of any finance constraints. The findings are related to theoretical propositions and existing empirical literature.
INTRODUCTION
The main aim of this paper is to explore the impact of financial factors upon the innovative performance of European firms. Particular issues to be addressed are the relative importance of financial constraints versus other constraints upon innovation, and whether the importance of financial factors varies across firm sizes, industries and countries. There has recently been extensive growth in the literature that looks at the impact of financial factors upon the investment of firms in both fixed capital and R&D (a common proxy for innovative performance). The empirical analysis related to this literature largely relies upon the econometric explanation of firm or industry level panel data sets on investment and/or R&D and firm and market characteristics with financial factors being represented by the inclusion of a cash flow variable as an indicator of potential financial constraints. Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998) present reviews of this literature as regards investment in fixed capital. Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) argue that R&D and thus innovation might be expected to be even more sensitive to financial factors than physical investments be-cause it is relatively more risky and generates less easily realisable assets in the case of bankruptcy.
In this paper we rely upon quite different data. Our empirical research is based upon the responses of firms to questions in the second community innovation survey (CISII) on the relative importance of different constraints upon innovative behaviour. The relative advantages and disadvantages of questionnaire data of this kind are well known. In the current circumstances the great advantage is that the data set encompasses all the EU countries (and EU wide panel data sets suitable for the more common firm of analysis are not available) and the questionnaire was standardised across those countries. It also provides direct information relating to firms' beliefs upon the importance of financial factors (although questionnaire data of this kind may of course produce biased responses) rather than requiring one to rely upon the use of a proxy (i.e. cash flow) as an indicator of financial constraints.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we discuss why, theoretically, financial factors may play a role in innovation and why this role may differ across countries, firm sizes and industries. In section 3 we discuss the data and in section 4 present the econometric framework to be used in this paper. In section 5 we analyse CISII responses upon the relative importance of financial vs. other factors as a constraint upon innovation. In 3.section 6 we analyse the patterns of CISII responses upon the importance of financial factors by country and firm size and in section 7 by country and industry. In section 8 we discuss how the empirical findings relate to the theoretical predictions and draw conclusions.
Theoretical foundations
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem states that if there are perfect capital markets then the firm's financial structure is irrelevant to its investment (including innovation) decisions and as such investment and -finance decisions are independent of each other. In a perfect capital market therefore, financial factors would play no role in investment determination. This result however relies upon (at least) three basic assumptions holding i.e. that there are (i) no possibilities of default on loans (ii) no taxes and (iii) no transaction costs. As such conditions do not hold generally, investment and finance decisions are interdependent and thus the nature and functioning of capital markets may well impact upon investment and innovation under-taken.
Aspects of the nature and functioning of capital markets considered to be important in the investment and R&D literature (see Stoneman (2001a) then encompass the following.
(i) Market completeness. The completeness of a capital market concerns issues relating to the diversity of capital instruments available. Debt and equity are the two main capital instruments, but other instruments such as derivatives, venture capital and convertible bonds may also be available. Not only might some less developed markets not offer all such capital instruments but it has been argued that even in the most sophisticated markets such as the UK and the US that there are "finance gaps" especially for small firms. If there are such gaps firms may well be constrained in the achievement of their optimal finance arrangements and their investment and or R&D spending may be affected.
(ii) The number of buyers and sellers . A perfectly functioning market requires a large number of buyers and sellers (large being defined to be sufficient to generate price taking as opposed to price setting behaviour). It may be that certain markets are very thin especially on the supply side and as such there are monopoly rents to be earned through higher finance charges. If so, then the higher costs of finance will either drive firms to use alternative, less suitable, financing and/or lead to less investment and/or R&D.
(iii) Market inefficiency. If markets are inefficient then security prices will not correctly reflect available information and the cost and availability of 4.finance may not be that appropriate to the investment or R&D project being funded. If stock prices are not always strong form efficient then at some time the firm's stock will be undervalued. Myers and Majiluf (1984) argue that in such a situation firms may be reluctant to finance an investment through the issue of new stock since the new shareholders will benefit from the ultimate revision of the value of the existing stock. In such cases the management may pass over profitable projects. Further, as firms may be reluctant to issue new equity, they would use either fixed interest debt or carry financial slack in the form of retained earnings. This model forms the basis of Myers (1984) Pecking Order theory of finance in which firms rank sources of finance preferring to use internal funds first, then external debt and then finally new equity to finance new investments.
(iv) Cost of capital. When evaluating an investment project the correct discount rate for the firm to use in the calculation of the net present value of the project is the opportunity cost of capital appropriate to the class of investments. For standard projects that are simply extensions or replications of existing assets this may be obtained from the CAPM or arbitrage pricing theory. If the investment is of a sort that has not been undertaken elsewhere before (an expected characteristic of innovation investments) then it may be particularly difficult to observe the systematic risk of similar projects in other firms (Goodacre and Tonks, 1995) and thus difficult to determine the appropriate discount rate.
(v) Asymmetric information. In general the manager or firm under-taking an R&D or investment project will have far better knowledge of the costs and payoffs of that project than the financier. This is asymmetric information. Goodacre and Tonks (1995) argue that because of the need for managers in such environments to provide signals to financiers as to the wiseness of their investment decisions, this may cause managers to undertake shorter term rather than longer term projects. In the presence of information asymmetries (or incomplete information) recent work (e.g. Winker, 1999, p170) argues that credit rationing may appear. Credit rationing is taken here to mean that banks (and others) deny loans to borrowers who are observation-ally indistinguishable from those who do receive loans. In such circumstances it is the availability of capital and not its cost that determines the level of investment. Even in the absence of credit rationing, asymmetric information may make external debt and equity more expensive than internally available funds. vi) Moral hazard. If an entrepreneur sells equity claims to outside in-5.vestors then s/he is no longer the sole owner of the project and may be better thought of as the manager employed by the outside investor. In such principle agent relationships there is always a moral hazard problem in that the agent will try to maximise his/her own utility rather than that of the principal. In particular it could be that this problem is especially exacerbated for long term firm decisions for the principal will then have to wait longer to see the outcome. In such circumstances the literature has discussed many varieties of contracts that will encourage the agent to pursue the desires of the principals. Goodacre and Tonks (1995) illustrate how these may discourage longer term investments. There is also some evidence that with optimal incentive contracts there may be under investment in risky projects by managers even when more attractive than a safe project.
(vii) Taxes and subsidies. Financing decisions will logically be based upon after tax costs and returns. The tax environment will thus have considerable influence upon the extent of investment and the means of financing investment. As tax regimes may differ across countries one may expect to find inter country differences on preferred finance structures (e.g. the balance of debt and equity) and on after tax costs of capital as a result.
(viii) Bankruptcy costs . If there are bankruptcy costs then the Modigliani Miller theorem does not hold. In the context of R&D, bankruptcy costs may well arise from the inability of the owner of the R&D asset to receive a fair price for that asset in the event of insolvency because the assets are highly specific and difficult to resell. Given that with a risky project cash flows are uncertain, it is possible that early in the life of such a project the profits will be insufficient to cover any interest payments on a debt instrument used to finance the project. For a newly established firm this could mean liquidation. Potential debt holders may well also realise this.
For new firms or single project firms therefore, equity may be the preferred borrowing instrument. For existing firms, the possibility of cross financing from other projects alleviates the bankruptcy risk and costs and thus there is not the same bias towards equity and debt and equity finance may be just as likely.
For all the reasons discussed above, one may expect to nd that to some degree at least investment in plant and equipment or innovation may well be affected by financial factors. The importance of the several factors listed may however vary considerably across firm sizes, industries and countries. Treating each in turn we may argue as follows.
It is often considered that there are special finance related issues in the context of SMEs. On the simplest level, firm size may of itself mean that the 6.availability of internally generated funds for the financing of an innovation project of a given size may be more difficult for smaller firms than larger firms. In terms of raising outside finance, for smaller firms, problems of information asymmetries may be more severe than for larger firms. Moreover for smaller newer firms there may be no track record upon which to base a case for funding and/or there may be fewer realisable assets to use as collateral. The costs of search may mean also that the supply of finance to such firms (in the absence of government intervention) may be more severely limited, and in particular, unless venture capital markets are well developed equity capital may not be available at all i.e. there may well be finance gaps. SMEs may well thus either be unable to raise funding for innovation (be credit rationed) or only be able to raise funding at a higher cost. EC (2000) reviewing the financial environment in which European SMEs operates argues that:
SMEs do face specic problems in accessing finance and in particular: early stage enterprises face the highest level of constraint; bank credit is the most common and for many enterprises the only external source of finance; apart from banks, friends, relatives and business angels are important sources of credit; small mature enterprises are least constrained by finance mainly relying on bank credit; highly innovative and expanding enterprises seem to have better access to credit than the average SME, mainly relying upon bank loans, but also having access to venture capital and business angels. The theory and such previous empirical findings would thus suggest that as firm size increases financial factors may well be less important as a constraint upon innovation.
Differences across industries (for given firm size) may also exist. An obvious consideration is that in more profitable industries there is less need for external funding than in less profitable industries. In riskier industries it may be more difficult to raise funding from outside the firm purely because of the risk factor. In more high tech sectors not only may risk itself be a factor but also the proportion of assets that are realisable may be lower. In high tech industries innovation is more likely to be of a sort that has not been undertaken elsewhere before and it may be particularly difficult to observe the systematic risk of similar projects in other firms (Goodacre and Tonks, 1995) and thus difficult to determine the appropriate discount rate to use in evaluating investment in the firm. All such arguments would suggest that in more traditional industries with extensive track records funding from internal and external sources will be easier.
For more high tech and newer industries funding is more likely to be a problem and thus impact more upon (constrain) innovative performance.
Differences across countries given firm size and industry are also likely to be apparent.
These may relate to factors such as taxes and subsidy regimes, the completeness of markets for finance, the legal environment as regards bankruptcy, government intervention etc. Such issues are part of the national systems of innovation literature (see Nelson, 1993) . Part of the national sys-tem of innovation of particular interest here is the financial environment in different countries. European financial environment are both heterogeneous and changing (see Stoneman, 2001b ). On the one hand in terms of the financial system per se there are bank based systems as typified by the German situation and on the other market based systems as typified by the UK.
Most continental European systems are largely bank based although there are signs of some movement in certain countries (e.g. France) to a market based system. Alongside these different systems there are different patterns of ownership of industry. The German system reflects greater private ownership, more concentrated ownership and more pyramid ownership. In the UK the patterns is for less concentrated holding, less private control and few intercorporate holdings. The different patterns of ownership allied with different financial systems generate different emphases upon insider and outsider control in the management of corporations. In the UK type system, although much of the equity may be owned by financial institutions, it is through the market itself, via the threat of take-over, that control is mainly exercised. In German type systems there is greater emphasis upon direct intervention by banks and co-operation between banks and management. The financing of investment by firms also differs across systems. Although self-generated funds are the main finance source for firms (except SMEs) in all countries these are more important in the UK, with bank finance more important in bank based systems.
It is argued that the different patterns observed in financial systems have important implications for the way firms behave. The argument is that bank based systems with insider control are particularly favourable to longer term steady development built upon the construction of trust based relations, firm specific investments and steady change but may generate a higher cost of capital due to bank monopoly power and perhaps undue conservatism.
On the other hand market based systems with outsider control and more arms length relationships between the financiers and the managers are seen as more favourable to major change and switches of strategic direction but encouraging liquidation of investment in the event of dissatisfaction with no obligation to take anything other than a short term view. It is not however being suggested that one system is better than another, it is more a matter of "horses for courses". It would be a surprise however if different national financial systems did not impact upon innovative behaviour. This is easy to accept. What is more difficult to predict is the direction and importance of that impact. A particular interest in the literature is the differences of impact between Anglo American market based systems and German-Japanese bank based systems. Bond et al.(1997) find that the sensitivity of investment to financial variables is quantitatively more significant in the UK than in France, Germany or Belgium 1978 -1989. This is interpreted as a particular failing of the market orientated UK system. Mulkay, Hall and Mairesse (2000) undertake a similar cross country comparison, but this time for both R&D and investment and between the US and France. Again significant differences are found across the two countries with a greater importance of profit or cash flow as a determinant of investment in the US than in France, however any differences are much less obvious when it comes to R&D.
Between 1982-1993, for investment, cash flow did not matter for French firms at all but significantly affected the investment of US firms. The authors argue that this is probably the result of real differences in the working of capital markets in the two countries. In particular they argue that US shareholders were some-what more likely to sell their shares in adverse situations providing greater market discipline and thus more rapid responsiveness of US firms to changes in their prospects. To the extent that US firms feel pressure to use internal funds to finance future spending, they will have a higher long run response to surprises in profits (not accompanied by surprises in demands) than would otherwise be the case.
This review of the theoretical arguments and (some) empirical literature indicates that one might expect to find that financial factors do impinge upon innovative activity. One might also expect that this impact will be greater for small and medium sized firms than for large firms.
The impact will also differ across industries with more risky, newer industries experiencing greater problems. There may also be differences across countries although theoretically it is difficult to predict the nature of the differences. Past empirical work suggests that market based systems may experience the greatest problems. In the next section we consider the CISII data that we will be using to explore these issues further in the later sections.
DATA DESCRIPTION
The data source used in this paper is the Second Community Innovation Survey (CIS II). This pan European firm-level survey was conducted (largely by national statistical offices) under the auspices of the European Innovation Monitoring System (EIMS) and Eurostat in 1997, so that the reference year for the survey is 1996 for most of the sample countries (although Norway and Portugal refer to 1997) 1 employees and more than 250 employees). Unfortunately, to preserve firms' confidentiality, firm level data was not available to us, the data used here is instead at the industry, country or firm class level of aggregation.
The section of the CISII questionnaire of most interest to us concerns the factors hampering innovation. The question asked is reproduced below.
1 A prior Community Innovation Survey (CIS I) was undertaken in 1993. Unfortunately, it suffered from both country-specific problems (e.g. the response rate in some country was so low that the results could not be published) and "cross-country" problems (e.g. in some countries firms were selected according to the principle of random sampling, in other countries the census was used, while a third category of countries defined a sample of likely innovators). We thus elected to concentrate in this paper on CIS II. 
Lack of customer responsiveness
The data available to us on the responses to this question are the proportions (relative to the number of firms reporting some innovative activity in the sample) for each impact (delay, abolish, not start) by country and firm size class and by country and industry (not by country, industry and firm size class). In the sections below we undertake two exercises with this data. In the first we are interested in how important are financial factors as opposed to other hampering factors as a constraint upon innovation in terms of their impact in leading to delay, abandonment or not starting innovation projects. In the second exercise we concentrate solely upon hampering factor 3 and explore more fully the nature of the financial constraints across firm size classes, industries and countries. In the next section we briefly summarise the econometric method to be used.
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
The econometric method we used below is known as a Generalized Linear Model ((GLM here afterward 
The binomial distribution belongs to the exponential family since the distribution
is a monotonic differentiable function. Moreover, we need to ensure that π is bounded between zero and one. That is we need to choose a cumulative probability distribution such that
and taking the logit transformation we can write equation (2) as
In the literature model (2) is usually referred to as the logit model or sometimes as logistic regression. To estimate the model we use maximum likelihood, the log-likelihood function for (Raftery (1996) ).
THE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL FACTORS
In this section we explore the importance in hampering innovation of financial and related cost and risk factors relative to the other hampering factors. The exercise is performed using data from 12 sample EU countries, it being necessary on the grounds of data deficiencies to drop Spain, Portugal and Luxembourg from the original sample of 15. The data allows a distinction between services and manufacturing and thus we also allow a two way industry split.
The basic approach is to separately consider for each impact (delay, abandonment, not start), the proportion of sample firms in each of the two industry sectors in each country who report such an impact, and to relate that to the hampering factors reported. Defining i as representing impact where the right hand side variables are dummy variables that take the value of unity when the data point relates to that factor and zero otherwise (in the estimates we keep Factor 9 as a baseline). The estimated parameters, for each i, provide, in essence, an average across industries and countries of the relative importance of the nine different factors in hampering innovation. In the tables that immediately follow we report the estimated coefficients for equation (4) , relating respectively to projects delayed (Table 1), abolished (Table 2) , and not started (Table 3 ).
In terms of the goodness of t, the Wald tests reported in Tables 1-3 indicate that the right hand side variables are highly significant in each case, moreover the relative p-values are close to zero. However, the AIC criteria is lower for projects abolished as a dependent variable, implying that the model better fits the data on delayed and not started projects. The main purpose of this exercise is to explore the relative importance of different factors in hampering innovation. In terms of the odds ratios we may observe that for projects not started and for projects abolished the dominant hampering factors are 1-3. These factors are still important in delaying projects but there factors 4 and 5 are relatively more important. Factor 3, a lack of appropriate sources of finance, is a dominant factor in projects not started and an important factor in causing delay but is relatively less important in leading to projects being abolished. This would make some sense if one considers that firms will not start projects if financing is not likely to be available and thus abandonment on financial grounds will be uncommon (as might be delay). There thus seems clear evidence that (especially as regards not starting projects) that financial factors are relatively important. This result is further emphasised if we group the hampering factors into three sub groups, the first covering factors 1-3 which we label finance, costs and risks (hereafter FCR), the second covering 4-7 (i.e. organisational rigidity, lack of qualified personnel, lack of information on technology, lack of information on markets) which we label internal factors and the third covering 8 and 9 ( fulfilling regulations and standards, lack of customer responsiveness to new products) which we label external factors. In Appendix Table 1A we present the correlation matrix across the nine factors. The full impact of financial factors may well be better represented by the impact of the whole FCR group rather than just factor 3. We see for example that in terms of not starting projects, the FCR factors are 3-4 times as important as any other factor. In firms of abolishing projects, although factor 3 itself, a lack of appropriate finance is not that important, the FCR factors in total are more important than other factors. In firms of delaying projects, the FCR factors are important but not as important as factors 4 and 5. The results lead us to conclude that a lack of appropriate sources of finance is a major hampering factor to innovation. The effect is most notice-able in terms of causing innovation projects to not be started. If financial factors are interpreted more widely to also encompass excessive risk and innovation costs too high then this result is further emphasised. As the sample is made up of firms that have actually recorded some innovative activity (non innovators are not even included in the sample) our results may even underestimate, in an absolute sense, the impact of finance as a barrier to innovation.
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS BY FIRMSIZE AND COUNTRY
Having established the relative importance of financial constraints as a barrier to innovation, in this section we focus on the third hampering factor listed in the CISII questionnaire and reported in Section 2: this relates specifically to a lack of appropriate sources of finance (Fac3 here afterward). In particular, we consider, for the same sample of twelve EU Member States, The estimates were generated with large firms, projects delayed, and Germany incorporated in the base line. Initial estimates using a likelihood ratio test and the Wald test statistic for each variable led us to drop several country dummies from our initial model 3 . The results of adding 21 interaction dummies (i.e. 3 firm classes times the remaining 7 country dummies with Germany in the base-line) one at a time to the model is shown in the Appendix (Table 2A) χ with j degrees of freedom. We include in the final model only those interactions which are significant at the 5% level or 10% at most (see Table ( 2A) in the Appendix). In Table 4a we present the estimated parameters and some goodness of t tests. In Table 4b we present the odds ratios that result from the estimates in Table 4a for projects delayed. These ratios are presented by country and firm size class. They are calculated by taking the exponential of the sum of the size coefficient, the country coefficient and any coefficient on the cross product of country and size. The odds ratio for large firms in Germany is unity, with the odds ratios for Belgium, Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands not being significantly different from those for Germany. From Table 4a we observe that the probability of delaying a project because of a lack of appropriate sources of finance, (taking account of firm size and country specific effects) is greater than that of abandoning or not starting a project (coefficients -0.822 and -0.274 respectively). This might be taken to contradict our finding in the previous section that factor 3 was relatively most important in causing non starts. However that analysis was of relative importance within an impact and not across impacts as has been analysed here. Multiplying the parameters in Table 4b by the exponential of the coefficients from Table 4a would yield the odds ratios by country and firm size class for projects not started and projects abandoned.
The table of odds ratios by firm size indicates that for all countries the probability of Fac3 constraining innovation is greater (up to a 100% greater in some countries) for medium sized firms than for small firms i.e. medium sized firms face greater financial constraints than small firms. This result is not as expected a priori. There are two potential reasons for this result. The first is that many countries have introduced special measures to assist small firms and this may be reflected in these results. Secondly, the sample being used for this analysis is conditional upon firms actually doing some innovation. If it were the case that the probability of doing some innovation was constrained by financial factors (for which we have some evidence even for innovating firms) and that small firms are more likely to face such financial constraints, only those small firms least constrained by financial constraints would be included in the estimation sample and that would bias the results towards lesser constraints for small firms.
Turning to comparisons of large firms to small and medium sized firms, the data in Table 4b indicates that: in France, Italy, Finland, and Norway, large firms are more likely to experience financial constraints than small and medium sized firms; in Sweden and the UK large firms are more likely to face financial constraints than small but not medium sized firms; in Ireland large firms are less likely to face financial constraints than both small and medium sized firms. The a priori expectation was that large firms would be least constrained and the data does not clearly support this view. Once again this could be because the sample is conditional upon firms actually undertaking some innovative activity and the presence of government assistance schemes to SMEs.
These results could also be reflecting different size compositions for firms in different industrial sectors. If, as we explore in the next section, firms in different sectors face different levels of financial constraints, and the average firms size differs across sectors, then the results in Table 4b could be reflecting this. Unfortunately our data does not allow decomposition by country size and sector.
The analysis of the odds ratios in Table 4b by country reveals significant differences. For small firms, those in the UK have the highest probability of facing financial constraints, some 70% greater than in Germany. Small firms in Ireland and Sweden also have high odds ratios.
Small firms in other countries have odds ratios either the same as or less than German firms. For medium sized firms, Irish firms stand out as having a particularly high odds ratio but Swedish and UK firms again have relatively high odds ratios. Italy Finland and Norway show (internationally relatively) low odds ratios for medium sized firms. For large firms, in France the odds ratio is 430% higher than in Germany, and also high in Italy, the UK and Sweden. All other countries show odds ratios greater than or equal to Germany. Thus, as far as large firms are concerned, the German financial environment is particularly favourable.
One explanation for these results may be based on the distribution of the enterprises by technological sector. According to the CISII results Ireland, UK, and Sweden are the countries with the highest shares of enterprises in the high-tech sector, while Germany has a strong position in the medium-high and medium-low branches. In general the share of innovating firms in a sector is higher, the higher is the sector's level of technology. As we will see in the next section high-tech enterprises are the ones more likely to experience financial constraints.
Therefore, to some extent, it seems reasonable to argue that the results in Table 4b are affected to some degree by the distribution of the enterprises according to the level of technology of the countries considered.
Having said this however, in the theoretical section we argued that one might well expect financial constraints to have differing impacts in different countries although it was difficult to predict a priori exactly in which countries the constraints would be most severe. However it was suggested on the basis of previous empirical work that firms in countries with market based systems as opposed to bank based systems would experience more financial constraints and a comparison of the UK to Germany could be taken as an indicator of this. It is clear that for all three firm size classes, the odds ratios is greater in the UK than in Germany and this may be support for the view that market based systems are more likely to constrain innovation.
However only for small sized firms is the UK odds ratio the largest estimated. For medium sized firms Ireland has a higher ratio and for large firms Italy and France have higher ratios.
Given that many factors other than whether systems are market based or bank based is likely to affect these ratios one cannot be definitive, but as the UK odds ratios rank as numbers 1, 2 and 3 (out of 12) for small, medium and large sized firms respectively, the circumstantial evidence that there are particular financial constraints in the UK compared to all other European, largely bank based, countries is strong. One might also note the empirical evidence quoted in section 2 above compared the UK to France, Belgium and Germany suggesting that financial factors were more important in the UK as a constraint upon investment. Our findings corroborate this except for large firms in France.
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS BY INDUSTRY
Having explored the relationship between financial constraints and firm size by country, in this final section we explore inter industry differences in the importance of financial constraints.
Again we restrict ourselves to the importance of Factor 3, a lack of appropriate source of finance. To see if our results are consistent with the ones in Section 6, we introduce as explanatory variables in the model not only industry dummies, but also country dummies.
Defining i as representing impact (i=1,...,3), l as the country (l=1,…,12), and m as the industry, the dependent variable for this analysis ( iml out inn _ ) is the proportion of firms in a country in an industry who report impact i from hampering factor 3. Unfortunately, we are severely constrained by data availability and this has led us first to consider only two impacts i.e. projects not started and projects delayed. We analyse these separately rather than together for reasons that will become apparent below. There are many gaps in the data at the industry level especially for the service sectors. Therefore, there is a trade-off between considering a larger number of countries but a smaller number of industries, or the opposite. Given the aim of the experiment, we have decided to reduce the number of countries considered in order to maximise the number of industries included in the model. Following this criteria our final data set contains 12 industries, and 9 countries for "project delayed" (i.e. 108 data points), and 8 countries and fourteen industries (102 data points) for "project not started" 4 . The right hand side variables in each regression are industry and country dummy variables that take the value of unity when the data point relates to that industry or country and zero elsewhere. The industry definitions are listed in Table 3A (see appendix).
In Table 5a and 5b we report the estimated coefficients for projects delayed and projects not started, respectively 5 . The industry chosen as a base line is "Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products", a rather traditional industry. As far as the country variables are 4 The countries considered for "project delayed" are Germany, France, Italy, Nether-lands, Finland, Sweden, UK, Norway for the sectors described in Table 5a , while for "project not started" we include Denmark but we do not include the following industries: "electricity" and "telecommunication". 5 In Table 5a concerned, to be consistent with the model in Section 6 we keep Germany as a base line. From Table 5a -b, we can see that the majority of the country odds ratios are less then one, meaning that the probability of having financial constraints for the countries analysed is less then the probability of having the same problem in Germany. The apparent inconsistency of this result with those reported in Table 4b can be explained by considering that, even though we do not know the characteristics of the firms in the industries, the proportion of the class "small firm" in the sample is much bigger then the medium and large firm classes (the approximate sample composition is 60:30:10, small, medium, large). The sample is also unbalanced across countries with for example Italy being over represented. It is likely that the results we find reflect the composition of our sample and as seen in Table 4b , the odds ratios for small firms are generally less than for large firms and often less than unity. The odds ratios in Table 5a are not inconsistent with those for small firms re-ported in Table 4b .
From Tables 5a and 5b it emerges that there are significant differences across industries in the importance of financial constraints and impacts on delay and non starts are also different across industries. Our theoretical discussion suggested that firms in newer, riskier and less profitable industries are likely to experience more financial constraints than in other industries.
We observe that in "Computers" and "Engineering" which might be considered newer and riskier industries, the odds ratio is particularly high for both projects delayed and not started. In "telecommunications" which again might be considered newer and higher tech, firms are more than twice as likely to not start an innovating project as in "Manufacture of basic metal". In more traditional sectors such as Food, Textiles and Rubber the odds ratios are relatively small (although it is difficult to explain why Wood carries a high ratio in Table 5b ). In Financial Intermediation which might be considered a more profitable industry, the probability of not starting an innovating project because of lack of financial resources at 0.67 is less than in the base industry.
To the extent that it is possible to draw conclusions from such patterns therefore, it would appear that the findings are consistent with the view that high tech and high risk imply greater financial constraints than low tech, low risk, and also that high profitability means fewer financial constraints. 
CONCLUSION
There is a growing literature upon the extent to which financial factors con-strain investment and innovation within firms. In this paper we have explored questionnaire data taken for the second Community Innovation Survey to ad-dress the role of financial factors in the determination of innovative activity within Europe. The theoretical literature suggests that financial factors will constrain such activity, but the importance of such constraints will vary according to characteristics of national financial environments, firm sizes and industrial sectors.
Using a generalised linear econometric model we initially nd that, of the several factors that could constrain innovative activity in Europe, financial factors, especially a lack of an appropriate source of finance, are the most important, generally outweighing the importance of other internal and external factors in causing projects to be delayed, abandoned or not started.
Exploring the role of a lack of appropriate sources of finance further we discovered significant differences between countries, firm size classes and industries in the extent to which the constraint binds. Theoretical predictions and past empirical work suggested that market based financial systems are likely to generate more severe financial constraints than bank based systems. Comparisons of the UK with other countries (especially Germany) confirmed this prediction. We also found evidence that higher risk, newer, less profitable industries are more likely to experience financial constraints. We found little evidence however that smaller firms are more financially constrained than larger firms, although there may be sample bias based reasons for this.
In the next few moths the results from the third Community Innovation Survey will be available. It is our intention to extend this work by exploring these issue upon that data set, which will also provide a time dimension to this study. 
